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labor supply. In Section III we consider the incidence of wage and capital taxes in turn. Section IV summarizes our findings and suggests some implications. An Appendix on utility maximization concludes the paper.
II. THE MODEL
In this section we first consider the individual optimization problem and then turn to the calculation of the general equilibrium steady-state properties of the model. Individuals live for two periods, consuming goods and leisure in period 2, and goods only in period 1. During the first period, an individual's time is divided between training and work. Training occurs only in the first period; the second period is devoted to work and leisure. We assume no first-period leisure in order to highlight the importance for tax incidence of the timing of the labor supply responses.6 As we demonstrate below, the inclusion of first-period leisure would not alter the conclusions provided that the compensated elasticity of labor supply when old exceeds that when young.
First-period consumption C1, second-period consumption C2, and second-period leisure 1, are chosen to maximize an intertemporal utility function, (1) U(C1, C2, 1) subject to C1 + +2= E, 1 + rn where E is the present value of an individual's lifetime earnings and rn is the net rate of interest.
The optimization problem can be divided into two parts. First, given 1, the individual chooses an optimal proportion S of the first period for training in order to maximize E, where Here Wn is the net wage rate, Ho is each individual's initial endowment of human capital, and H(S) is the human capital production function with assumed positive first and negative second derivatives.
A worker with human capital H(S) is equivalent to H(S)/Ho un-
trained workers. For simplicity, it is assumed that the only input into human capital formation is the worker's time. The measure of human 6. In addition, zero first-period leisure seems a reasonable assumption. Primary workers typically do not vary their participation much until retirement years. While there is some variation in the labor force, this is primarily due to differing training choices.
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capital accumulation S can be thought of as either the proportion of the first period spent in school or the proportion of time devoted to on-the-job training. Maximization of E for given 1, Wn, and r, yields the first-order condition (3) and the demand for training relationship Reducing second-period leisure increases the amortization period for human capital investment and leads to more training. Similarly, a fall in the interest rate raises the present value of the return and increases the optimal level of human capital accumulation. Since a change in the net wage varies both the costs and the return on human capital investment in equal proportion, it has no effect on the optimal level of training. Substituting for C2 from (1), (2), and (4), the consumer maximizes (6) over C1 and 1: In what follows, we consider the incidence of compensated tax changes. This is equivalent to assuming that the government spends tax revenues by giving lump-sum rebates. The same results hold if we impose the requirement that government spend (or save) the revenues in exactly the way the taxpayers would have. In the Appendix we derive formulae for changes in C1, C2, and 1 arising from compensated changes in the tax rates t,, and tr. The compensation takes the form of a lump-sum rebate of tax proceeds in the same period as the tax is incurred. Under the assumptions outlined in the 7. These results depend on the assumption that time is the only input in the production of human capital. If goods as well as time are inputs, the effects on S of changes in r, and I remain the same. Increases in W will lead to higher levels of s, however. We assume below that steady-state solutions are unique and stable.
III. TAX INCIDENCE
Before considering the incidence of a wage tax in our model, it is useful to describe the special case considered by Feldstein. His result on the irrelevance of labor supply elasticity to long-run incidence is immediate with a slight modification of (10). In the absence of human capital formation and allowing leisure in both periods, k * is Examination of (13) and (16) clearly shows that any compensated tax change which alters L 1 and L2 by the same proportion will change C1 by the same proportion leaving k* in (13) unaltered. Under this assumption of equal labor supply elasticities, the long-run burden of a compensated wage tax will fall entirely on labor, since gross factor returns are dictated by the production function and k * is unchanged. An interest income tax will, on the other hand, change gross returns, but any induced equiproportionate changes in L 1 and L2 will have no impact on ultimate incidence. Thus, an interest income tax may be shifted, but labor supply factors play no role. From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that the irrelevance of labor supply for long-run tax incidence requires very special assumptions. Given the ubiquitous forty-hour work week, on the one hand, and the substantial variation in individual working lives, on the other, the case for disproportionate labor supply response over the life cycle seems compelling. We therefore consider wage tax incidence in the general model we have outlined.
While our model assumes no first-period leisure, this feature of the model is not critical to the qualitative results. Equations (13) and (16) imply that if L2 falls by proportionately more than L1, the capital-labor ratio will rise, shifting the tax burden onto capital. Similarly, if labor supply is more responsive to taxation when young than when old, the net impact of the labor supply response is to shift more of the tax burden onto labor. The qualitative results we describe below remain true even with variable first-period leisure as long as the compensated elasticity of labor supply of the old exceeds that of the young.
The requirement of equal compensated labor supply elasticities at each age is fairly stringent and requires more than simply homotheticity of the utility function. For example, consider the utility function, U = log C1 + 1 g + log 11 + 10 +12 where 11 and 12 are first-and second-period leisure, respectively, and p is the rate of time preference. While this utility function exhibits completely inelastic uncompensated labor supply curves, the compensated labor supplies are elastic. Indeed, the compensated elasticity of labor supply when old will exceed that when young provided that r > p; for r = p the two are equal, and for r < p the relative magnitudes reverse. The condition r > p entails increasing consumption of leisure as one ages, presumably what we observe in the real world.9 Even assuming identical compensated supply elasticities at all ages, we see that our model is useful for thinking about the incidence of a pro-9. When one adds human capital to the analysis, the condition of equal proportionate reduction in labor supply is less likely to hold. In the case with no human capital accumulation, equal compensated elasticities of leisure lead to an unequal elasticity of labor supply if the initial level of leisure when old exceeded that when young. Adding human capital makes the elasticity of labor supply when young even smaller, since the reduction in labor supply when old leads to a shorter training period when young and hence more labor supply when young; i.e., even for equal percentage reductions in leisure in the two periods, there is a substitution of labor for training when young due to the shorter amortization period. We evaluate the derivative at tw = 0, that is, at the no-tax equilibrium. Given the assumption that substitution effects dominate, dCl/dW > 0, and dCl/dr < 0. Hence all terms in the denominator of (17) are unambiguously negative except for m1. Stability requires that the denominator be negative, otherwise the wage would rise or fall without bound if perturbed away from the equilibrium level. We therefore assume that m1 is small enough to insure stability.
Turning to the numerator of (17), we first consider the case of no human capital accumulation (S = 0, ds/dl = 0). In this case the numerator is (18) -k*2Hdc + k* < 0 dtc dtc with the inequality following from (7). Hence a labor income tax unambiguously raises the gross of tax wage. The economic mechanism is simple; earlier retirement raises the savings rate, increasing capital intensity. In addition, it reduces the steady-state per capita labor supply. These effects may increase the capital-labor ratio by enough to leave a higher net of tax wage in the post-tax equilibrium. The greater the retirement elasticity and the smaller the elasticity of substitution in production, the greater is the shifting of the wage tax onto capital.
The second special case we consider is that of fixed leisure (retirement) and variable human capital accumulation. In this case labor bears exactly 100 percent of the tax; the numerator of (17) From the restrictions found in (7) it is easy to see that the gross interest rate is increased by a capital income tax. It is even possible for the net interest rate to rise. In addition to reducing savings by encouraging first-period consumption for a fixed earnings stream, the tax encourages second-period work effort. If we append the additional condition that d1/dt' = 0, our model reduces to Diamond's [1970] model in which the same results hold.
Second, if 1 is fixed, but S is free to vary, and r > g, some of the tax burden will be borne by labor. In this case we have
Thus, unlike the wage tax, the incidence of an interest income tax is affected directly by the elasticity of human capital supply. The more sensitive is human capital accumulation to changes in the net interest rate, the greater the shifting of the tax. This shifting arises, in part, from an increase in the steady-state human capital stock when r > g and, in part, from a decline in earnings and thus savings when young. The implication of these results is that capital need not bear an interest income tax even in the long run. Even if, as is frequently assumed, consumption is completely insensitive to the interest rate, part of the burden of the interest tax will be shifted to labor through human capital variation. Unfortunately, little is known about the dependence of human capital investment on interest rates.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper calls attention to the economic implications for long-run tax incidence of viewing labor supply as multifaceted. We have demonstrated that allowing for variable retirement and human capital accumulation alters conventional conclusions regarding long-run tax incidence. In particular, the responsiveness of retirement age and training duration to the taxation of wage income plays an important role in shifting a wage tax onto capital. Second, the interest income tax may be shifted onto labor even if consumption is unresponsive to the interest rate through induced changes in human capital accumulation. Only more realistic models and empirical estimates of key parameters will permit evaluation of the importance of these effects.
The analysis has obvious relevance to the design and study of If we assume that U12 = U13 = 0 and U23 > 0, then L12 is negative as is dCI/dtw c. These assumptions are in accord with the standard separable intertemporal utility functions used in growth models of this kind. The signs of dCi/dtrc and dl/dtrc are also unambiguous, assuming that L12 < 0. The sign of dCI/8tr reflects the substitution away from the now more expensive second-period consumption as well as the increase in consumption in both periods due to the greater supply of labor when old. The negative sign of dl/dtrc results from the higher price of leisure induced by greater human capital accumulation. In addition, the price of second-period leisure rises relative to first-period consumption and means a substitution away from leisure toward first-period consumption.
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